The 8nd Airborne and a Narrow Run Thing

“I charge you all – put us down in Holland or put us down in hell, but put us down all in one place or I will hound you to your graves.” – Lt. Colonel Louis Mendez, 3/508 PIR

As Brigadier General Gavin stood in the doorway of his C-47, laden with 70 pounds of equipment, including an M1 Garand semi-automatic rifle, preparing to jump into the Nijmegen sector with other units of the 82nd Airborne Division, he contemplated the nature of his mission. 

The 82nd Airborne’s mission lay at the physical center of the operation, between Arnhem and Eindhoven. In Gavin’s hands, the division (known as the “All Americans”) was to secure the high ground near the Dutch town of Groesbeek, to protect the landing zones for the balance of divisional troops expected in the following 48 hours. 

Groesbeek lay at the foot of some of the highest ground in the Netherlands, which radiated northwards, towards Nijmegen and the German border, which (at its closest) was less than two miles away. In this zone of closeness was Germany’s Reichswald forest which was thought to hold German tanks. For this reason, the 82nd Airborne was going in with eight 57mm anti-tank guns of A Battery (80th Anti-Aircraft and Anti-Tank Battalion). The guns and their gunners would arrive in 22 gliders. (WSEG Staff Study No. 3, pg. 101)

In reality, no German tanks existed in the Reichswald. However, there did exist a number of rear-echelon German troops from the Sixth Military District (Wehrkreis VI). 

These troops were made up of convalescents, new recruits, instructors, men on leave, and garrison personnel, including aging World War I veterans. The assorted force belonged to Korps Feldt (a collection of rear area and training units under General Kurt Feldt) and its subordinate unit, the 406th Zur Besonderen Verwendung (ZBV, Special Purpose) Division. The 406th Division directly commanded 6,669 of the second and third-rate troops who were strung out across small camps from Kleve to Kaltenkirchen. (Buckley & Preston-Hough, Ch.6, loc. 2844, 36%)

The 82nd Airborne also had to capture the main road bridge and the railway bridge at Nijmegen, a millenia-old factory and university town, to enable the Horrocks’ XXX (30) Corps to advance to Arnhem.

Nijmegen, a city of about 100,000 people, was dominated by six major roads leading out of a massive roundabout in the centre of the town. One of the roads led to a second roundabout south of the road bridge, a majestic structure spanning the fast-moving Waal river.

The bridge linked southern Holland with Arnhem and the north. Dominating this area of the city was an ancient fort called the Valkhof. Nearby was Hunner Park, a flower garden. (Nigel Nicolson and Patrick Forbes, The Grenadier Guards in the war of 1939-1945, Volume 1 (Gale & Polden, 1949), pg. 124)

The railway bridge was about half a mile downstream.

The Americans, however, would soon discover that rear-echelon units of the 406th Division had occupied the southern approaches to the bridge and Hunner Park. Many of the Germans had little combat experience. This would not diminish their value as fighting troops when the shooting began. By the morning of the 18th, they would be reinforced by units of the 10th SS Panzer Division.

Other critical objectives included one long river bridge at Grave and at least one of four bridges over the Maas-Waal Canal. In all, the division had to secure a 25 square-mile perimeter.

During the planning for the operation, the 82nd Airborne’s chief of staff, Colonel Robert H Wienecke complained that the division’s mission area was more appropriate for two airborne divisions.¹⁹

But “there it is – and we’re going to do it with one,” Gavin had said. (John C McManus, September Hope (Penguin, 2013), pg. 12-13)

Gavin, Golden boy

Gavin’s rise to command of the “All Americans” had been meteoric. With a reputation as a man who always “wanted to be where ‘the action” was, Gavin so impressed the 82nd’s original commander, Ridgeway, that he became assistant division commander in December 1943 and jumped into Normandy in this capacity. (McManus, ibid.)

When Ridgeway was promoted to lead XVIII Airborne Corps, Gavin became divisional commander of the 82nd Airborne (on 26 August 1944) but with the relatively junior rank of Brigadier General and no assistant commander to back him up. 

But Gavin had a fierce determination to succeed, stemming from his childhood, when he had been orphaned to a New York City convent at the age of two. He was eventually adopted in 1909 (two years later), and grew up in the Pennsylvania coal town of Mount Carmel. All he knew as a child was familial dysfunction, poverty and privations. 

At age 17, he joined the army as a Buck private and began a meteoric rise through the ranks. (McManus, pg. 10-11; “Out of the Ranks to a Three-Star Job,” LIFE (20 January 1958), pg. 22)

Although 37 years old in 1944, he resembled a man in his mid-twenties: tall, slim and athletic; handsome, with a chiseled, baby face that had narrow cheekbones and a lean nose.

He exuded confidence and his men gave him such nicknames as “Slim Jim” and “The Jumping General” (for his propensity to jump with his men straight into combat). Women found him attractive to the point that he had a reputation as a womanizer.

But if this gives the impression that Gavin was some kind of callous lothario, that would be erroneous. Gavin had a sensitivity that was almost uncharacteristic of professional soldiers in command of a division.

Once, during the battle, Ridgeway had come into Gavin’s command post (CP) and finding him absent (Gavin was at the frontline) had left a letter “demanding an immediate explanation.” This act, which may seem relatively minor to us over eight decades later, would so wound Gavin that he would ask to quit the division.

Writing in his diary at the time, Gavin said:

I know airborne operations as well as anyone in our service. I have been very lucky. Four combat jumps are a lot. I am ready to leave the service and try my hand at something new. I care not what. The only thing against this is a means of livelihood. I can fare reasonably well on what retirement I have earned. In the meantime, I’ll try anything. Whatever it is, I want to get completely away from the army and war. This letter of Gen. Ridgeway epitomizes all that I have never liked about our army. After 20 years of service, the past three years as a parachutist, the year and a half in combat with this division, to have successfully undertaken an extremely difficult combat mission, then to be sent a letter by my corps commander asking for an immediate explanation in writing why I flagrantly violated the tenets of military courtesy during the heat of combat upon the occasion of a visit to my CP. He has not seen fit to make any remark, good or bad, on our battle. And, worst of all, I was extremely considerate and courteous and always have been. Time to get out of his outfit. Perhaps the army too.

(Sorley, pg. 256-257)

But Gavin was not relieved of command. In October 1944, for his talents, Gavin was promoted to become America’s youngest Major General since George Armstrong Custer. 

In the Nijmegen area, the 82nd Airborne Division would begin day one with 7,444 troops (out of an estimated total divisional strength of 11,994). Unlike Urquhart’s British 1st Airborne, most of the first wave in the 82nd Airborne were battle-hardened paratroopers, accompanied by a handful of artillery men and support personnel such as signalers and engineers.²⁰

Confused Orders

But the 82nd was hobbled. Hazy orders from Browning’s I Airborne Corps headquarters appeared to prioritize the capture of the Groesbeek heights (to protect the division’s landing zones), instead of the bridges at Nijmegen which were vital to XXX Corps.

In its orders to the 82nd Airborne, British I Airborne Corps described the capture of the heights as being “imperative” to holding the bridges in the area. (21st Army Group, pg. 104) Browning feared that the Germans would deploy artillery on the heights and limit movement throughout Nijmegen.

He told Gavin: “Although every effort should be made to affect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen bridges, it is essential that you capture the Groesbeek ridge and hold it.” (McManus, pg. 64)

While Gavin did not push back against this, he separately told Colonel Roy Lindquist, commander of the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR), that although the regiment’s primary mission was to hold the high ground at Berg en Dal near Groesbeek, he was also to send his 1st Battalion into Nijmegen to take the road bridge.

Lindquist, however, was confused about how to hold Berg en Dal while simultaneously making for the bridge. He did not clarify the matter with Gavin and instead assumed that he was to try to capture the bridge after the high ground had been secured. (McManus, pg. 64)

The flawed arrangement would rob the Allies of a chance to secure the bridges within 24 hours of landing. The 82nd Airborne also had too few troops in the first 48 hours to adequately hold all of its far-flung objectives.

Gavin was also hobbled by the presence of about 900 US glider pilots who were untrained for combat – unlike British glider pilots who were trained to fight as infantry. (Allied Airborne Operations in Holland; pg. 22)

The 504th PIR had the task of secure at least one of the four canal bridges and the key bridge at Grave town. The 505th PIR landed around Groesbeek. The 508th PIR would drop north of Groesbeek at 1328 hrs. A post-action divisional history would record that the “drop patterns were excellent.” (A Graphic History of the 82nd Airborne Division (US Army/SHAEF, 1945), pg. 4)

In fact, the accuracy of the airborne landings in all three sectors (Arnhem, Nijmegen and Eindhoven) would dispel the notion that daylight operations over enemy territory, heavily defended by flak, can be “excessively hazardous”.

“Market has proven this view erroneous,” wrote General Brereton in his after-action report. “The great dividends in accuracy of drop and landing, and in quick assembly of troops which may be had from daylight operations were enjoyed to the full.” (See Narrative of Operation Market (US Army, 14 July 1945))

Capturing the Grave and Canal bridges

The 504th PIR had previously fought in Sicily and Italy in 1943, but had been bled white in those battles and had thus unable to participate in the Normandy campaign. 

Now, the regiment was back in action. Its E Company (of the 2nd Battalion) landed south of Grave and moved to take the Grave bridge from the west. The rest of the 2nd Battalion, under Major Edward Wellems, landed on the other side of the river, at Overasselt, and set off to take the bridge from the east. This was, after all, the only way to capture bridges – from both sides. 

The Grave bridge over the Maas river was of vital importance as it spanned 800 feet of water that could not be easily crossed if the bridge was blown up. However, the US paratroopers captured the bridge at about 1430 hrs and then secured Grave town after the 400-strong German garrison fled.

Meanwhile, units of the 3rd Battalion (504th PIR) set off northwards, towards Bridge No 10 (actually two spans; a road and rail bridge running alongside each other) at Honinghutje. Meanwhile, the 505th PIR seized Groesbeek town at 1300 hrs and secured its area of responsibility from the towns of Kamp to Mook. 

At 1900 hrs paratroopers from 1st Battalion (504th PIR) succeeded in capturing a canal bridge (No 7) at Heumen after heavy combat. The bridge was a lock that rose up to allow boats and barges to go through. 

However, German troops blew up all the other canal bridges in the area and badly damaged bridge 10, elevating the US capture of the Heumen bridge.

Erroneous information

On the Groesbeek-Nijmegen road, the 508th PIR’s 1st Battalion (under Lt. Colonel Shields Warren) was at De Ploeg, settling in for the night when a Dutch resistance report arrived, claiming that only 18 Germans were defending Nijmegen.

The regimental commander, Lindquist, ordered Shields to seize the Nijmegen road bridge. (McManus, pg. 157)

The report was false. At 2000 hrs, heavy German fire 400 yards from the bridge brought Shields’ battalion to a dead stop. This was the result of hundreds of German troops pouring into the 82nd Airborne’s area hours after the landing.

Among the German units rushed to the 82nd Airborne’s area was the 39th Grenadier Replacement and Training Battalion, which despite being located 110 kms from Nijmegen, was battling US paratroopers six hours later. (Buckey & Preston-Hough, Ch. 6, loc. 2870, 36%)

In their after-action report, the 82nd Airborne command staff noted that the Germans had about eight battalions-worth of troops in the sector.

“Enemy reaction was prompt and appeared to follow a definite pattern,” the report said. “All local [German] troops were committed immediately in ‘piecemeal’ fashion. Nearby homeguard-type troops were thrown in as quickly as they could be rushed to the operational area.” (A Graphic History of the 82nd Airborne Division, pg. 3)

In fact, the Germans moved with stunning alacrity to fight the Allied airborne in all sectors.

Shield’s A and B Companies, in Nijmegen, were also confronted by members of a 750-man Kampfgruppe which bore the name of its commander, Oberst (Colonel) Henke. (McManus, pg. 162; Kershaw, pg. 99) 

Within Kampfgruppe Henke was 1st/6th Home Defence Training Battalion (with three companies, composed of WWI veterans and overage reservists)²¹, plus a company of the Hermann Goering Training Regiment, and an Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) school already operating as a security detachment at the Nijmegen road bridge. (Buckey & preston-Hough, Ch. 6, locs. 2892-2899, 37%; Kershaw, pg. 99)

These untried troops would fiercely resist Shield’s men and subsequent American efforts to take the bridge, with one historian describing German resistance as “severe”. (Phil Nordyke, All American, All the Way, Zenith Press, 2010; pg. 78) 

The fighting spirit of such ersatz forces at the bridge would be emblematic of the role played by poorly equipped rear-echelon German troops in frustrating the ambitions of the 82nd Airborne.

Distracting the Airborne

At mid-morning on the following day, 18 September, six German battle groups from the 406th Division attacked from out of the German border. Their objective was to overrun the landing and drop zones and reclaim Groesbeek. The attackers were again second or third-rate personnel from training and replacement units, battalions with “stomach and ear” personnel (infirmary cases), and Luftwaffe men from defunct NCO schools.

The Germans, attacking from the direction of the German town of Kranenburg, ejected a US 508th PIR platoon from the German village of Wyler. By 1100 hrs, had surrounded the 508th PIR’s D Company which was protecting the regimental supply dump. American supply clerks had to become a fighting unit to cover the evacuation of the dump.

The German attack also partly overran Landing Zone T where the 82nd Airborne second airlift was scheduled to arrive at 1200 hrs. 

To his relief, Gavin learned that bad weather in England had delayed the second airlift. At 1110 hrs, the 1st Battalion (508th PIR) and the regiment’s G Company went into action, to recapture LZ T.

The Germans, some of whom were untrained recruits or aging World War I veterans, were no match for the elite paratroopers who in many cases, went after them with fixed bayonets. By 1400 hrs, the Germans were in retreat, abandoning 149 of their own as prisoners of war (POWs). The Germans also left behind 16 anti-aircraft guns. Further south, 1st Bn/505 PIR was counterattacking eastwards and clearing LZ N.

Around 1500 hrs, amid diminished small-arms and artillery fire, the second airlift, with 429 gliders arrived. 

They carried three artillery battalions (319th & 320th Glider Field Artillery, 456th Parachute Field Artillery), the balance of the 80th Anti-Aircraft and Anti-Tank Battalion, the division medical company (307th Airborne Medical Co), plus 177 vehicles (mostly jeeps) for the parachute infantry, division headquarters and signals, according to Gavin. (James Gavin, Airborne Warfare (1947), 61%)

Casualties were light and Gavin was pleased that he had 1,650 additional personnel with their weapons, tools, and vehicles to strengthen his perimeter. At the same time, he was also aware that nearly all of the new arrivals were support forces. In the meantime, every available combat trooper was required to hold the frontline which now stretched from Mook (in the south) to Groesbeek (in the center) to Wyler and Beek (in the north).

As the day went on “the German attacks were increasing in extent, intensity, and duration,” Gavin said. (Airborne Warfare, 61%)

While the attacks by the rear-echelon troops of the German 406th Division did not make a major dent in the 82nd Airborne’s lines, they preoccupied the “All Americans” long enough to buy time for units of the 10th SS Panzer Division to reinforce Nijmegen.

This would delay the fall of the city and capture of its bridges to 20 September. 

Capturing the Nijmegen Bridge

By the afternoon of 19 September, Dutch resistance and US intelligence estimated German troop numbers at Nijmegen at about 4,000. This included about 500 “top-quality” Waffen-SS troops of Kampfgruppe Euling, which commanded the road bridge. The SS were supported by an 88mm gun on the traffic circle, backed by four 47mm guns, a 37mm gun, and mortars in Hunner Park. (Kershaw, pg. 194) 

Postwar discourse sometimes blames the 82nd Airborne for not seizing the Nijmegen bridges in the first 48 hours. In reality, the “All Americans” never had a chance of taking the bridges on their own without the help of the Guards Division. And the Guards only reached Nijmegen on the afternoon of the 19th (which was D+2).

Such was the scale of German resistance at Nijmegen that Guardsmen also had to pay a heavy price in lives to secure local objectives, despite wielding a sizable number of tanks and other heavy weapons. A preliminary airstrike by British Hawker Typhoon fighter bombers at Nijmegen at 1530 hrs did not dissuade the German defenders, who fought fiercely. (The Grenadier Guards, pg. 195)

The Guards attacked along three prongs (towards the Nijmegen post office, towards the rail bridge, and towards the road bridge). At least 20 Guards Sherman tanks went into battle, American paratroopers riding on the hull. 

Several British Sherman tanks were hit and one was blown up as they approached Hunner Park. The paratroopers also suffered casualties before the Allied Generals called off the attack as night fell.

Allied units in the Nijmegen battle, 19-20 September

Objective	Allied units involved in the attack
The Post Office attackers, 19 September (under British Major G Thorne)	– Two platoons from No 3 Company, 1st Grenadier Guards – One tank troop under Lt. James W Scott from No 1 Squadron, 2nd (Armoured) Grenadier Guards -One platoon of US paras picked at random from road by Gavin
Western Force (units headed for the rail bridge), 19 September (under British Captain J W Neville)	– D Company (Captain Taylor Smith) of 505th PIR – One motorised platoon under Lt. J C Moller from No 3 Company, 1st Grenadier Guards – One tank troop under Lt. G R Merton from No 2 Squadron22 of the 2nd (Armoured) Grenadier Guards
Eastern Force (units headed for the road bridge), 19 September (under US Lt. Colonel Ben Vandervoort)	– E, F & HQ Companies of 2nd Battalion, 505th PIR (Lt. Colonel Ben Vandervoort) – Three platoons from No 2 Company (Captain The Duke of Rutland) of the 1st Grenadier Gds, minus one motor platoon and one carrier section – Three tank troops from No 3 Squadron (Major Alexander M H Gregory-Hood), 2nd (Armoured) Grenadier Guards
Capture of the Nijmegen road bridge, 20 September	– HQ, E and F Companies of 2nd Battalion, 505th PIR – Three platoons of No 2 Company, 1st Grenadier Gds, minus one motor platoon and one carrier section – Three tank troops from No 3 Squadron, 2nd (Armoured) Grenadier Guards – No 4 Company, 1st Grenadier Guards – King’s Company, 1st Grenadier Guards

German units at Nijmegen, 19-20 September

Unit	Commanders	Location	Composition
Kampfgruppe Henke (Oberst Henke of Fallschirmjäger-Lehr Stab 1)
Kampfgruppe Runge	SS Sturmbannführer Otto Runge	Around rail bridge	SS Junkerschule, three companies of 6th Ersatz und Ausbildungs Bataillon, and elements of 406th Division
Kampfgruppe Melitz	Luftwaffe Major Melitz	Inner city between the railway bridge and the road bridge	4. and 5 Kompanie, 14. Schiffstamm Abteilung, 4. Batterie, Schwere Flak Abteilung 572 and a Flak Ersatz Abteilung
Fallschirmjäger Ersatz und Ausbildungs Regiment “Hermann Göring”	Major Ahlhorn	Southern approach to the road bridge and Valkhof	Elements of Grenadier Ersatz und Ausbildungs Bataillon 365
10th SS Panzer Division units
1. Kompanie (10th SS Panzer Pionier Abteilung)	SS Untersturmführer Werner Baumgärtel	Hunner Park
Kampfgruppe Euling	SS Hauptsturmführer Karl-Heinz Euling	Hunner Park	II. Bataillon of the 19th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment
Kampfgruppe Reinhold	SS Sturmbannführer Leo Reinhold	Lent, north of the road bridge	II. Abteilung of 10th SS Panzer Regiment (no tanks)

The Waal Crossing

Meanwhile, the Allied Generals had decided to also capture the north bank of the road bridge. Major Julian Cook’s 3rd Battalion (504th PIR) was assigned to conduct a crossing of the river Waal in flimsy, canvas boats, in broad daylight, on the afternoon of the 20th.

As the paratroopers rowed through the wide, fast-moving Waal towards the German-held northern bank, heavy fire rushed down at them, past a whirling smokescreen laid by British tanks on the south shore. German conscripts on the north bank mercilessly raked the first wave of boats (roughly carrying about 390 paratroopers), killing about 48 and wounding about 160 others. (see Margry)

British officers watching the scene from the safety of the south bank were in awe of the action transpiring on the river and the far shore. Lt. Colonel Giles Vandeleur of the Irish Guards, watching through binoculars, saw none of the surviving paratroopers waver after reaching the north bank. 

Only the dead or the wounded fell; not a man unscathed failed to rush the Germans. “My God, what a courageous sight it was,” Vandeleur said. (Gavin, pg. 179)

Browning turned to Horrocks and said: “I have never seen a more gallant action.” (ibid.)

Waal River Crossers, 504th PIR, 20 September 1944

Wave	Time (hours)	Unit	Notes
First	1457	H and I Companies, plus 3rd Battalion staff	26 boats in the first wave; 13 sunk
Second	1515	G Co, 3rd Bn HQ & HQ Company	13 boats available
Third	1530	C Company
Fourth	1600	A Company
Fifth	1700	1st Bn HQ and HQ Company
Sixth	1900	B Company

What none of the observers could see was the brutal hand-to-hand combat which ensued on the north shore. The American survivors were in such a murderous rage that after spilling ashore on the north bank they killed every German they found – even 15-year-old conscripts and senior citizens who had been exempted from service earlier in the war – even those trying to surrender. (Margry, Vol 2, Part IV, 68%; Kershaw, pg. 197)

The American seizure of the north bank imperiled German chances of holding on to the bridge. Although the Germans had prepared the bridge for destruction, Model had ordered Harmel and Bittrich not to detonate the charges because he thought the bridge would be useful for a counterattack. Harmel and Bittrich thought this was madness. (Kershaw, pg 193)

When armor and infantry of the Guards Division began to cross the bridge, Harmel decided to blow the bridge. To his shock, he discovered that the charges would not blow. 

Jan van Hoof

In one of those legends that often emerges in war, there grew a rumor of unexpected heroism, of a 22-year-old student and resistance member named Jan van Hoof who had sneaked onto the bridge to cut several cables, including key wires leading to the demolition chamber, saving the bridge from destruction. 

There was no evidence that van Hoof had saved the bridge, except that he had excitedly told his sister on the afternoon of the 18th that the “bridge is safe.” Later, his parents also found a pair of insulated pliers in the overalls that he had worn on the morning of the 18th. 

The van Hoof was brave, even heroic, is indisputable. He was killed on 19 September while acting as a guide for a British Humber armored scout car. Wearing a Dutch helmet and an orange armband that identified him as a member of the resistance, van Hoof sat on the armored car’s mudguard, in the open.

A German 20mm gun destroyed the Humber, killing the two British soldiers inside. Affected by the concussion of the blast or perhaps even wounded, van Hoof jumped from the vehicle. 

When Germans called out to him to surrender, he shouted: “Dutchman, Free Netherlands!,” before collapsing. 

German troops ran up to him, pulled him away and seeing his orange Dutch resistance armband, began to pummel him. Then they put a bullet through his head. (Margry, Vol 2, Part IV, 50%)

A three-year Dutch government inquiry, conducted from 1949 to 1951, investigating the saving of the bridge gave van Hoof the benefit of the doubt, although the matter remains controversial. 

The fact is that the Germans tried to blow the bridge under the impression that their mechanisms, circuits, and cables for demolition were intact. That these mechanisms had been disrupted can only be attributed to another party. 

Whatever or whomever the cause, the magnificent bridge remains standing to this day.

Rage against the Guards

The Germans had lost the Nijmegen road bridge. The way was open to Arnhem. But to the utter disbelief of the American airborne, they watched the Guards halt for the night on the north bank. 

The commander of the 504th PIR, Colonel Reuben Tucker, was livid. Tucker had crossed the river in the fourth wave. He had seen the losses suffered by his men. But the thought that the Guards were not even ready to exert themselves to save the lives of their own countrymen at Arnhem, enraged him.

“Your boys are hurting up there at Arnhem,” he said to a Guards major. “You’d better go. It’s only 11 miles.” 

The British Major responded that the British tanks could not proceed until their infantry caught up with them. Tucker was incoherent with rage. His radio dispatches to Gavin were laced with profanity against the Guards. (Gavin, pgs. 181-182)

“We had killed ourselves crossing the Waal to grab the north end of the bridge,” Tucker wrote later. “[And the British were tucking] in for the night, failing to take advantage of the situation.” (Ryan, pg. 421) 

Gavin later complained to Horrocks that the actions of the Guards on the north bank of the bridge had “bitterly disappointed” the 82nd Airborne. Gavin insisted that the British should have immediately sent a “task force” straight for Arnhem Bridge.

“In fact, at the time, [Gavin] felt that the British had let them down badly,” Horrocks later wrote in his diplomatic memoir, Corps Commander. (Horrocks, pg. 154) 

He added that Gavin had no clue of the traffic chaos which had erupted at Nijmegen, which was still a battlefield. However, Horrocks also admitted that he was also concerned about the fate of his armor.

“The country in front between Nijmegen and Arnhem, which we called the Island, was almost impassable for tanks; all the narrow roads ran along the tops of embankments, with wide ditches on either side, and any vehicle on an embankment was a sitting duck for the German anti-tank gunners hidden in the orchards with which the Island abounded: one knocked-out vehicle could block a road for hours,” he wrote. (Horrocks, pg. 154)

But a daring armored task force racing forward at night might have traversed the island by dawn to reach Arnhem bridge. 

Tucker thought of sending the 504th PIR into the night but dismissed the idea because the regiment was at less than half strength and almost out of ammunition. (Ryan, pg. 421-422) 

The British 1st Airborne was once again on its own.